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PUNITIVE PAST TO CURRENT CONVENIENCE
A STUDY OF THE TEXAS LAW OF USURY
by
Ray Pearce* and J. McDonald Williams**
N HIS classic work, The Common Law, the lawyer who was later to
become Mr. Justice Holmes commented: "The substance of the law at
any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is
then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the de-
gree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon
its past." 1
Mr. Justice Holmes' "general rule" furnishes an appropriate starting
place for, and is an aid to the understanding of, the development of the
law of usury in Texas.
I. RELIGIOUS AND HISTORICAL ROOTS
The "past," insofar as the law of usury is concerned, consists in part of
constitutional and statutory provisions and judicial precedents, but in far
greater and more significant part of Judeo-Christian religious doctrine.
Several passages in the Old Testament condemn the practice of usury in
the strongest terms. Christian writers, from the first century onward, con-
sidered the lending of money "upon usury" to be sinful, and by the time
of the Middle Ages, when Christian doctrine dominated the thought pat-
terns of all Western European civilization, the habitual practice of usury
was grounds for ex-communication, a penalty which, in those times,
amounted not only to a denial of access to the sacraments, but also to a
virtual casting out of society.'
Not only was usury considered to be sinful, but the definition of what
constituted usury was, by modern standards, extremely broad. Before and
during the Middle Ages, it was generally understood that one was guilty
of usury if he lent money and required the borrower to repay the principal
sum, plus interest or some other additional charge, but did not participate
in the risk of the business in which the money was employed. "Risk," for
this purpose, did not refer to the risk of not being repaid. The risk neces-
sary in order to avoid the taint of usury was the risk of success or failure
of the particular business enterprise. A partnership, or other risk-taking
venture, was permissible, even if one partner furnished capital only, and
received (if the venture was successful) a return of his capital plus inter-
est on the amount of his investment; but the mere lending of money, in
order to "earn" interest on it, was not-and the proscription applied with-
LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** LL.B., The George Washington University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
'0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1, 2 (1881).
2Deuteronomy 23:19; Psalms 15; Leviticus 25:36.
'See generally S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES (1963); J. NOONAN, THE ScHo-
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out regard to the amount of interest (or other charge) the lender required
for the use of his money.
The first major change in the concept of usury occurred during and
after the Reformation. Usury was still thought to be sinful, but the defini-
tion changed from that of charging any interest (on a "non-risk" loan)
to that of charging an excessive amount for the use of the money loaned.
The change of definition had two principal consequences. The first was
that, since the receiving of interest was no longer considered to be, in and
of itself, improper, there was a slackening of the restrictions against usury;
or, to put the same thing another way, an increase in the number of differ-
ent activities which could be engaged in without running afoul of the pro-
hibitions against usury. The second was a change in the focus of the usury
inquiry. As long as the receiving of any interest (or other compensation)
for the use of money was considered sinful, the focus of the inquiry was
upon the lender-the inquiry being whether the lender was guilty of exact-
ing usury. But after receipt of some income for the use of money was ac-
cepted as permissible, the focus tended to shift away from the moral status
of the lender, and to the economic or social effect that a particular lending
practice had upon what was thought to be the good of society as a whole-
that is, the economic or social effect of usury.
Determining what is good for a society as a whole is the task of its law-
makers. It is therefore not surprising that the social regulation of permis-
sible interest rates eventually became embodied in statutory form, first in
the Statute of Anne' and then in similar statutes widely adopted in the
American states. There has been substantial variation in the legislative
notions of how much interest it takes to amount to usury. The issue, from
a lawmaking point of view, became and remained one of determining
what regulation of interest rates is "convenient" for the cultural commun-
ity to which the regulation applies.
Convenience has been thought to be served, at some periods of time, by
prescribing a maximum interest rate applicable to all loans. At other times,
especially in the late nineteenth century under the influence of the Ben-
thamites, the statutes applicable to permissible rates of interest have been
repealed in their entirety and the price of money has been left to be de-
termined in the marketplace. Today, when access to credit is considered to
be of prime importance, the lawmakers have tended to permit varying
rates of interest for various types or sizes of loans.
But the past continues to affect the present. The tendency to think of
usury in moral and religious terms has affected the approach and in some
instances the decisions of the courts. This is not to say that the courts talk
in these terms. They do not. Their decisions most often are based upon the
particular wording of constitutional and statutory provisions, and upon
the decisions in previous cases. But the language the courts sometimes use,
and the decisions they reach, without regard to what they say, reveal the
presence of this tendency at work.
412 Anne c. 16 (1713).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Texas has been more than willing to experiment in its approach to what
is "convenient" with respect to usury law. Usury (defined as charging
interest in excess of ten per cent per annum) was early prohibited by sta-
tute.' Then, in 1869, the legislature repealed the usury laws. Article 12,
section 44 of the constitution, adopted in that year, prohibited the legisla-
ture from making any further laws limiting the amount of interest that
could be collected for the use of money.' Seven years later, in the wake of
a flood of credit abuses, the 1876 constitution incorporated a prohibition of
interest above twelve per cent per annum;' this limit was lowered in 1891
to the present ten per cent.' The legislature has from time to time aug-
mented the constitutional provisions with additional statutes covering, in
the main, the remedies for usury.
The present version of the constitutional provision on usury, as amended
in 1960, reads in part as follows:
The Legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders, license and
regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of interest; provided,
however, in the absence of legislation fixing maximum rates of interest all
contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum (10 %) per annum
shall be deemed usurious; provided, further, that in contracts where no rate of
interest is agreed upon, the rate shall not exceed six per centum (6%) per
annum.
The 1960 amendment was designed to enable the legislature to classify
loans and lenders, so that some loans could bear, though other loans could
not, interest at a yearly rate of more than ten per cent. The adoption of
this amendment was followed in short order by the enactment of the Texas
Regulatory Loan Act,"0 which in turn was recently supplanted and ex-
panded by the Consumer Credit Code. 1
Lawmakers are affected, as other citizens are, by the historical view that
usury is morally repugnant and criminal in nature. The 1876 constitution,
for example, read in part that the legislature shall "provide appropriate
pains and penalties to prevent and punish usury."1 The present-day policy
of focusing on the economic consequences of usury, on the other hand, is
illustrated in the preface to the Consumer Credit Code, which talks in
terms of unregulated credit abuses that "bring great social and economic
hardship to many citizens of our State" and "impose intolerable burdens
on those segments of our society which can least afford to bear them-the
uneducated, the unsophisticated, the poor and the elderly."
'See generally the history recorded in 3 VERNON'S ANN. TEX. CONST. 75 (1955), following
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
'TEx. CONST. art. XII, § 44 (1869).
7Id. art. XII, § 11 (1876).
'Id. art. XVI, § 11 (1891).
9 Id.
"eTEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6165b (Supp. 1967).
'lid. art. 5069-1.01-50.06 (Supp. 1967).
"TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
"8TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 § 1(4) (Supp. 1967).
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III. ELEMENTS OF USURY AS CONSTRUED BY THE COURTS
The constitutional and statutory provisions relating to usury are hardly
self-applying. Consequently, a large body of case law has grown up at-
tempting to define the contours of usury and, particularly, the concept of
interest. Judicial analysis of a usury case generally begins with a perfunc-
tory recitation of the court-developed elements of usury. The following
are usually listed: (a) an agreement to lend money; (b) the borrower's
absolute obligation to repay the loan; (c) the exaction of a greater com-
pensation than allowed by law for the use, forbearance, or detention of
money; and (d) an intention to exact usury"
Agreement To Lend. One of the few cases in which the requirement of an
agreement to lend was instrumental in the decision is Greever v. Persky.'"
In Greever the original contract, providing for usurious notes, covered a
ninety-day term; but the notes were renewed and the borrower continued
to pay usurious interest following the expiration of the term. The court
held that the interest received during the contract term was usurious. But,
stating that one of the necessary elements of usury is a contract to pay
usurious interest, the court concluded that the voluntary acceptance of
interest in excess of the lawful rate during the period after the original
term was not sufficient to constitute usury.
Unquestionably, the borrower paid usury. The lender received the addi-
tional usurious interest in consideration for its renewal of the notes and
forbearance from collecting the notes when due. The court did not, how-
ever, elect to view the case in terms of whether or not usury was paid by
the borrower or in terms of the sociological or economic effect of the
transaction. Rather, the court appears to have focused on the freedom from
"guilt" of the lender-that is, the lender at the outset of the agreement
did not contract for or intend to collect usury for the additional term.
The court does not even couch the decision in these terms; instead, it
clutches the requirement of an agreement to lend as a convenient handle
for resolving the case.
Absolute Obligation. The requirement that the borrower be obligated to
repay the loan illustrates the historical concern with differentiating between
ordinary risk-taking in a business venture and risk-taking incident to a
loan. Thus, usury laws are not applicable to a transaction in which repay-
ment depends on the contingency that a well to be drilled will produce a
certain quantity of oil;'" similarly, the question of usury is irrelevant in a
transaction which is essentially an investment in a joint venture where the
parties pool their resources and hope to earn a profit."
4 See Campbell v. Oskey, 239 S.W. 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); 58 TEx. JU.. 2d Usury
S 8 (1964).11140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942), which the court remanded for a determination of
whether or not there was a contract to collect interest after the stated term.
" Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error ref.
1 Burton v. Stayner, 182 S.W. 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref. However, if there exists
a contingency under which the interest payable may exceed the lawful rate, the agreement may
be deemed usurious. See Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282
(1930).
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Excessive Interest. The judicial requirement that there be an exaction of
interest greater than that allowed by law has resulted in a number of in-
genious efforts to characterize loan charges as something other than interest.
These efforts, and the courts' responses, are reviewed in the next section of
this Article.
Intent. Finally, the element of intention to exact usury self-evidently re-
flects a concern with the "guilt" of the lender, without regard again to the
economic or sociological effect of the particular transaction. The element
of intent, however, rarely receives a court's admitted attention, particular-
ly when the contract imports usury on its face."8 If the contract is not
usurious on its face, courts have on occasion recited that the borrower must
prove "some corrupt agreement, or device or shift to cover usury."'" How-
ever, this recitation seems to be used most often as a postscript, to indicate
an orthodox rationale for a decision founded on a strained statutory con-
struction or strictured approach in defining the term "interest."
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES INTEREST?
The problem of ascertaining what charges imposed by a lender constitute
interest has been generative of most of the usury litigation. On its face,
the problem would seem appropriately resolved by resort to statutory con-
struction. Indeed, this often is the tack taken by the courts. But interest
is not a statutorily defined term." Moreover, the judicial efforts to define
the term interest cannot be separated from the religious and social poli-
cies pertaining to usury. A review of the types of charges incident to loan
transactions illustrates the difficulties courts have encountered in attempt-
ing to reconcile the policies underlying the usury laws with a construction
of the laws themselves.
Computation of Interest. Before reviewing the various charges that may
or may not be interest, a word about the method of computing interest is
in order. The ten per cent ceiling on interest (other than under the Con-
sumer Credit Code) refers, of course, to simple interest and not to the
"add-on" interest rate where interest is charged at the outset and the com-
bined interest and principal are amortized in installments.
The problem of computing the "true" interest rate in the latter situation
has led to the development of rules of law concerning the allocation of pay-
ments between principal and interest. One such rule is that, where the
parties do not agree otherwise, installment payments are applied first to
accrued interest and then to principal. The recent case of Community Say-
s Kollman v. Hunnicutt, 385 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) in which, despite the bor-
rower's testimony that there was no usurious intent, the court held that the intent was apparent
-res ipsa loquitur.
"9Moser v. John F. Buckner & Sons, 292 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref.
n.r.e.
"o "Interest" is generally defined as "a compensation, usually reckoned by a percentage, for




ings & Loan Ass'n v. Fisher" illustrates the difficulties encountered in ap-
plying this rule. In Fisher the loan closing statement specified that the
principal amount of the loan was $7,200 and the rate of interest was five
per cent discounted. The borrower executed a note in the amount of
$10,800, payable in 120 monthly installments.
The borrower decided to prepay the note after having made fifty-one
payments, a total of $8,584.93. He calculated that five per cent per
annum on $7,200 for fifty-one months would be $1,530. He then sub-
tracted the sum paid ($8,584.93) from the total principal ($7,200) and
the interest computed to date at five per cent ($1,530) and concluded that
he still owed $145.07 as principal. He tendered this amount, plus the $75
prepayment charge, to the lender, which the lender refused to accept as
full payment.
The court rejected the borrower's claims that either the five per cent
figure stated in the closing statement should govern the rate, or, alterna-
tively, if the five per cent figure was not the rate of interest, then no rate
had been specified and the lender could charge only six per cent under the
statute.2 The court held that the true rate of interest must be ascertained
by calculation.
To determine the rate, the court recited the rule that "where parties do
not agree otherwise, partial payments on an interest-bearing obligation are
ordinarily applied first to accrued interest and the balance to principal."'"
The court stated that the true percentage is that which, "when applied to
each monthly balance of principal will, upon crediting the payments in
accordance with the rule above stated, result in complete amortization of
the $7,200 principal advance and the $3,600 interest charge in 120 month-
ly payments of $90 each as agreed by the parties."' 4 Using this method, the
court ascertained that the true rate was 8.69 per cent per year. The court
concluded that the borrower was "not entitled to have earned interest com-
puted on the balance of the principal remaining unpaid from time to time
after the advance payments are credited thereon,"' the note not being
payable "on or before" the stipulated maturity dates.
Such problems in ascertaining the true rate of interest have led to the
requirement in the Consumer Credit Code that the number of dollars rep-
resenting interest be specifically set forth, rather than the "rate" which
may be computed by various means."
Service Charges. Charges for services normally incident to the making
of loans, and charges to the borrower for the lender's overhead expenses,
will be deemed interest for the purpose of determining usury. Courts take
the view that ordinary handling expenses arising in a loan transaction
"' 409 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1966). See generally Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws,
8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 54 (1941).
" TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5070 (1962).
"1Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fisher, 409 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1966).
24 Id.
2"Id. at 551.
"TEx. REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.15 (Supp. 1967).
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should be compensated out of interest, not by means of a separate charge.
Accordingly, the following types of charges have been held to be interest:
handling charge;" carrying charge;2" service charge;' bond issuance ex-
pense;' storage fee;"' bookkeeping expense;2 and origination and loan dis-
count fee."
On the other hand, it is customary to impose on the borrower, in addi-
tion to interest, certain types of charges related to a loan transaction. For
example, courts have recognized that charges for separate professional
services, such as appraisal and inspection services' and attorneys' fees," are
beneficial not solely to the lender and thus have independent significance
warranting a separate charge. Some courts, in justifying such fees, have
suggested as a test that the fees must be paid to a special agent of the lender
with limited authority and that the lender must not participate in the fees."
Credit Insurance. The case law seems to be settled that premiums on
credit insurance required as a condition of making a loan will not be con-
sidered interest, as long as the premiums are reasonable in amount and the
borrower may select the insurer.' But if the lender requires the borrower
to obtain credit insurance in a company either for which the lender is an
agent or from which the lender receives a commission, such premiums will
be deemed to be additional interest.8
The problem arose initially out of provisions in the Texas Insurance
Code declaring excessive commissions or premiums on credit insurance to
be interest." The Code has since been amended, however, to provide that
the premiums or costs of credit insurance:
27Trinity Fire Ins. Co. v. Kerrville Hotel Co., 129 Tex. 310, 103 S.W.2d 121 (1937).
"Forreston State Bank v. Brooks, 51 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"Thrift Fin. Co. v. State, 351 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.
"Eastern Mortgage & Sec. Co. v. Collins, 118 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.
"Joy v. Provident Loan Soc'y, 37 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dismissed.
"Independent Foods v. Lucas County Say. Bank, 46 Ohio L. Abs. 434, 70 N.E.2d 139
(Ct. App. 1946).
"Bankers Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Fisher, 2 Ohio Misc. 18, 204 N.E.2d 103 (C.P.
1964).
'Siebert v. Hall, 63 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1933). The Comptroller of the Currency has re-
cently ruled that a national bank may receive an inspection fee on a construction loan in addition
to the maximum rate of interest. Lehr, Current Legal and Regulatory Developments, 4 THE NAT'L
BANKING REV. 111 (1966). The Comptroller has also ruled that "subject to contrary or limiting
state statute, a national bank may exact from a borrower in addition to interest taken at the
highest rate permitted under state law, reasonable fees or compensation for credit reports or in-
vestigations with respect to a borrower's credit." Compt. Rul. 7315 (1966).
"1 James v. Davis, 150 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dismissed.
'4Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937). Compare discussion under Bro-
kerage Fees and Commissions, accompanying notes 45-52 infra.
"Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Kerpel, 38 Misc. 2d 856, 238 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Ware v. Paxton, 266 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e. But see Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y v. Scali, 751 Ill. App. 2d 255, 220 N.E.2d 893 (1966) in which the court held
that the premiums received on a life insurance policy required in connection with the mortgage
on a house rendered the loan usurious; the court stated that "Equitable was at least as interested
in selling life insurance as it was in making the mortgage loan, and that the purpose of requir-
ing [the mortgagor] to buy the policy was not to provide necessary security for the loan, but
was, rather, to make a profit on the life insurance in addition to the interest on the loan." 220
N.E.2d at 897.
"sWare v. Paxton, 266 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
39TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, §§ 6, 10 (1963). See, e.g., Western Guar. Loan Co. v.
Dean, 309 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Ware v. Wright, 266 S.W.2d 188
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Hatridge v. Home Life & Accident Ins. Co., 246 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951).
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[S]hall not be deemed interest, or charges, or consideration, or an amount in
excess of permitted charges in connection with the loan or other credit
transaction, and any benefit or return or other gain or advantage to the
creditor arising out of the sale or provision of such insurance shall not be
deemed a violation of any law, general or special, of the State of Texas.4"
The Insurance Code also provides that, when credit insurance is required
as additional security for any indebtedness, the borrower shall, "upon re-
quest to the creditor," have the option to place the coverage through any
insurer authorized to transact an insurance business within Texas."1 Giving
the borrower the theoretical right to choose his insurer is a rather bland
palliative since the commercial practice is for the lender to have (as a
matter of convenience to the borrower, of course) credit insurance forms
for a particular insurance company available for use by the borrower. And
these forms are apparently used in most cases.
The Code provision quoted above is on its face broad enough to elim-
inate entirely the question of whether or not charges for credit insurance
may be deemed to be interest. In the event, however, that a court should
determine that a lender's charges for credit insurance were, in fact, a guise
for usury or that the lender was receiving additional consideration for plac-
ing the credit insurance, it is doubtful that these provisions could with-
stand an attack under the usury provision of the Texas Constitution.' A
similar problem may soon be presented under the retail installment sales
provisions of the Consumer Credit Code,' because many large retailers
maintain their own or affiliated credit insurance companies for writing the
insurance required for their retail credit installment sales.
Lenders, of course, stress that the purpose of credit insurance is to serve
as additional security for the lender or the seller-lender. In this sense, the
premiums (which create a fund that eventually may be applied to the
loan) resemble other devices, such as investment certificates," which have
been characterized as ruses to collect additional interest. One obvious dis-
tinction is that collection of the proceeds is contingent. However, if the
lender also collects portions of the premiums (whether as commissions or
otherwise) he is receiving an additional yield from the use of money un-
related to the security.
Thus, the legislature has apparently resolved the conflict between the
insurance-lending industry and the borrowing public by refusing to con-
sider any of the traditional policies relating to usury: either the borrower
has been ignored or a judgment has been made that access to credit is of
greater benefit than the detriment involved in paying additional amounts
for the use of money.
Brokerage Fees and Commissions. A commission or brokerage fee paid to
40 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, § 9 (Supp. 1967). See generally Davis, Does the Texas Credit
Insurance Act "Legalize" Usury?, 11 Sw. L.J. 139 (1957).
4 1 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, § 11 (Supp. 1967).
4A similar statute in Arkansas was held to violate that state's constitutional provision against
usur'. Stricker v. State Auto Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d 307 (1952).
ITEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.04 (Supp. 1967).
"See, e.g., Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961).
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the agent or broker of the borrower (or to an independent broker acting
for the borrower in the transaction) for services rendered in connection
with a loan transaction will not be considered interest, as long as the broker
maintains no regular affiliation with the lender and the lender receives
no part of the fee.4" Any fees paid the lender, or its agents, for negotiations
or other such services related to a loan, however, will be deemed interest."
Several Texas cases illustrate the types of practices that will transform
such fees into interest. In Deming Investment Co. v. Giddens"7 the lender
loaned the borrower $13,000, evidenced by a $12,000 note, plus coupon
notes in the amount of the stated interest. The borrower was also required
to execute five additional notes, purporting to represent commissions
earned by the lender for negotiating the loan. The "commission" charges
were justified by the lender on the ground that, in the loan application, the
borrower appointed the lender its agent to procure the loan. The court
stated that:
It is immaterial how or in what manner or form the lender of money cloaks
a usurious charge for its use or detention. If the result is that such lender,
by such means, exacts more than the maximum rate of interest, the contract
is vitiated with the taint of usury. The lender may style the excessive interest
a bonus or commission given to him as agent, but if he is in fact the lender
of the money, and hence acting for himself and not for another, and receives
the bonus or commission for the lending of his own money, the law denomi-
nates such 'bonus' or 'commission' as 'additional interest.4
In Donoghue v. State"9 a loan company arranged with a bank to obtain
funds to conduct a small loan business. The bank entered into an agree-
ment with the loan company under which the bank supplied all the neces-
sary loan forms; the completed loan applications, together with the sup-
porting notes and chattel mortgages, were transmitted daily to the bank
for approval. The bank also guaranteed the loan company's drafts and
purchased its discount paper. The loan company charged usurious interest.
In a suit against the loan company and the bank, both were held liable.
The court concluded that the bank was not merely acting in a brokerage
capacity; since the contract allowed the bank to supervise closely the oper-
ations of the loan company, the business was, in effect, a joint venture be-
tween the two and the bank also was deemed to have charged usurious
interest.
In Greever v. Persky ° the borrower contacted the defendant and offered
him a commission to procure a loan. The defendant borrowed the money
from a third party, giving his own notes, and in turn advanced the money
to the borrower, who executed notes therefor. In holding the commission to
be interest, the court stated:
" Dewey v. American Nat'l Bank, 382 S.W.2d $24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.;
Graham & Locke Invs., Inc. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.;
Great S. Life Ins. Co. v Williams, 135 SW.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dismissed.
" Deming Inv. Co. v. Giddens, 41 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dismissed.
47 Id.4
1 Id. at 262.
49211 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
50 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942).
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An agent or a broker may lawfully charge a commission for his services in
negotiating a loan with a third party, and such commission will not be taken
into consideration in determining whether or not the loan is usurious, where
it is done in good faith and not as a mere cloak to avoid the usury law. But,
in order to be valid, it must appear that the loan was ultimately made with
or passed on to a third party, and that the extra charge was made in good
faith for so negotiating the loan. Such a charge may not be made where the
party charging the commission is merely lending his own money .... In this
case the party charging the commission did not negotiate the loan to a third
party, but made it himself out of his own funds; and, as a consequence, the
commission charged and collected by him must be included as interest charged
for the use of money lent.51
But in Noel v. Panhandle Building & Loan Ass'n" an insurance sales-
man solicited prospective borrowers. The applications for loans were filled
out and forwarded to the lender for approval. If approved, the lender re-
turned the papers to the insurance salesman who then had the instruments
executed and recorded. The borrower was required to pay the insurance
salesman a two per cent commission, no part of which was received by the
lender. The court held that the commission did not constitute interest.
As is implied in the quoted extracts from these cases, the courts have
tended to focus on the "guilt" of the lender, rather than on the economic
effect on the borrower. If the lender receives the commission, it will be
deemed interest; if an independent loan broker receives the commission, it
will not be deemed interest. Thus, in a context of tight money and rising
interest rates, the use of independent loan brokers has been hailed as a
relief to lenders (particularly large institutional lenders) who otherwise
would have to absorb the cost of procuring or servicing loans.
Prepayment Penalty. An additional fee charged for prepayment of the
loan is not considered interest. " Courts have recited varying reasons for
this result: that the contingency of prepayment is within the borrower's
control;54 or that the charge is considered to be made for a new and sep-
arate agreement, i.e., the termination of the indebtedness which would
otherwise continue.5 This treatment has been justified on the ground that
the lender has already committed itself to make available certain funds to
be advanced in the future or has projected its earnings or loan planning
based on its outstanding loans for the terms contemplated. The lender
may very well receive usurious interest for the term the indebtedness is ac-
tually outstanding. And there is an agreement to pay usury in the event
this contingency occurs. By stressing that the contingency is within the
control of the borrower, the courts seem to be implying that the lender
has not intended to exact usury, and therefore is not sufficiently "guilty"
to warrant the imposition of the penalties incident to usurious transactions.
"Id. at 67, 165 S.W.2d at 711.
2 85 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
'See generally T. PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS § 18, at I (Supp. 1960).
"Abbott v. Stevens, 133 Colo. App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955).
"Feldman v. King's Highway Say. Bank, 278 App. Div. 589, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1951),
aff'd, 102 N.E.2d 835 (1951); Reichwein v. Kirshenbaum, 201 A.2d 918 (R.I. 1964).
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Acceleration Clauses. Acceleration clauses are another example of a con-
tingency within the borrower's control-acceleration is normally permitted
only if the borrower fails to do something he has promised to do. However,
the courts have treated acceleration clauses differently from prepayment
clauses.
The general rule emerging from the Texas case law appears to be that a
clause permitting acceleration of principal and earned interest will not
render the transaction usurious. " But if the holder of the note may ac-
celerate payments including unearned interest, and such interest would
exceed ten per cent, the note will be deemed usurious in its inception since
it provides for a contingency under which more than ten per cent interest
could be collected.
The leading case covering acceleration clauses is Shropshire v. Commerce
Farm Credit Co.,"s in which the deed of trust securing the note provided
that, upon default, all the notes should become due at the holder's option.
Since the deed of trust further prohibited abatement of unearned interest,
the court concluded that the contract stipulated for usurious interest. The
court continued:
By the stipulations of the contract, the term of the loan, at the creditor's
option, does not extend beyond the date of default in discharging any install-
ment of interest. For the reduced term, which must now be looked to in
determining the question of how much interest was promised or paid, the
debtors promised and actually paid interest at a rate greater than 10 per cent
per annum."
In Commerce Trust Co. v. Best"0 the court of civil appeals stressed that
usury:
[D]oes not depend on the question whether the lender actually gets more than
the legal rate of interest or not; but on whether there was a purpose in his
mind to make more than legal interest for the use of money, and whether,
by the terms of the transaction, and the means used to effect the loan, he may
by its enforcement be enabled to get more than the legal rate.6'
In the subsequent case of Marble Savings Bank v. Davis5 the note con-
tained an acceleration clause providing that upon default the "whole
indebtedness may ...be declared due and payable." The court construed
this language to refer only to principal and accrued interest; the note was
thus salvaged from usury. It thus appears that, if the note or supporting
instruments do not expressly provide for the recovery of unearned interest,
an acceleration clause will not render the transaction usurious.
"6Sinclair v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 355 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.
"Clements v. Williams, 136 Tex. 91, 147 S.W.2d 769 (1941).
8 120 Tex. 400, 39 S.W.2d 11 (1931). See also National Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Mahanay,
124 Tex. 544, 80 S.W.2d 947 (1935) (bonds "with interest and all indebtedness and charges se-
cured thereby"); Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank v. Brashear, 65 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1934) (notes and "all interest thereon to the date of payment thereof").
agShropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 403, 39 S.W.2d 11, 14 (1931).
60 54 S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), aff'd, 124 Tex. 583, 80 S.W.2d 942 (1935).
61 54 S.W.2d at 1039.
62 124 Tex. 560, 80 S.W.2d 298 (1935). See also Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Knight, 237 Ark.
802, 376 S.W.2d 556 (1964), in which the court held that an acceleration clause would not per-
mit the creditor to recover unearned interest.
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In such cases the courts have reverted to the position of viewing the
transaction solely from the lender's standpoint. In this connection, it has
been held that the inclusion of a savings clause will cure the usury infec-
tion. The courts have indicated that such a clause demonstrates that the
lender does not intend to collect usurious interest." The exaltation of the
savings clause in such a case obviously conflicts with the general rule that
actual intent is irrelevant, since intent is presumed when a contract is
usurious on its face.
Taxes. A flurry of cases has concerned provisions in loan transactions
specifying that the debtor must pay any taxes and other assessments on the
note, or deed of trust, or on property serving as security. In Kansas City
Life Insurance Co. v. Duvall" the deed of trust required the borrower to
pay any tax assessments on the bonds involved in the case, if the bonds
were the property of a non-resident. In holding that such a provision ren-
dered the contract potentially usurious, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
The happening of the contingency here under consideration depends upon
nothing more remote than that a nonresident assignee may establish for the
bonds a tax situs in this state. That such a contingency might happen can
hardly be said to be so remote as not to have been contemplated by the parties
when the contract was made. It is not dependent for its happening upon new
legislation or a change in the law that might be made in the future. Its
happening was a present possibility of such moment at the time the contract
was made that the tax provision was incorporated therein."
In subsequent cases, however, the requirement for showing the potential
usury was stiffened. In Robertson v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co.," for example, the court stated that:
In order to show that it contained potentialities which would make it usuri-
ous, certainly it was incumbent on debtors to prove facts showing that under
its terms the interest rate, by reason of tax levies, would at some time during
the contractual life of the bond exceed 10 per cent. Without laying down
any definite rule in this respect, we will say that, in our opinion, the burden
would be upon the debtors to prove that under prevailing standards of valua-
tion fixed from year to year, and under prevailing rate or rates fixed from
year to year, the taxes which might be levied against the bond would cause
the amount exacted to exceed the legal rate of 10 per cent per annum upon
the amount of the bond unpaid."
Concern with the remoteness of the contingency in these cases suggests
that what is paramount is the lender's intent and not the actual receipt of
usurious interest. If the prospect that the contingency will occur is remote
(which is determined by allocating the burden of proof), then it likely was
not intended by the parties.
6"Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
64129 Tex. 287, 104 S.W.2d 11 (1937). See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rowley, 133 Tex. 372,
128 S.W.2d 20 (1939).
" Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Duvall, 129 Tex. 287, 288, 104 S.W.2d 11, 12 (1937).
"134 Tex. 588, 137 S.W.2d 760 (1940).
'I1d. at 592, 137 S.W.2d at 765. See also Texas Land & Mortgage Co. v. Mullican, 132 F.2d
241 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 163 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.
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Again, a savings clause generally will avert a determination of usury
since it manifests an intent to avoid the collection of usurious interest.
68
However, the courts have not been consistent here with their approach in
the acceleration cases. In cases concerned with the payment of taxes a sav-
ings clause will not redeem a transaction otherwise usurious on its face. In
Temple Trust Co. v. Sewell,"9 for example, the deed of trust securing the
note contained a savings clause to the effect that, if the taxes and interest
on the bond exceeded ten per cent, the grantor was not responsible for the
excess. The court held this clause ineffective since the bond on its face
provided for usurious interest.
Charges After Maturity. A provision in the loan agreement requiring
the payment of interest on matured, unpaid installments of interest is per-
missible, the theory being that after maturity the overdue interest becomes
a separate demand on which interest may be charged and, further, the in-
currence of the charge may be prevented by the borrower." Similarly, a
provision for attorneys' fees or other fees incident to collection after de-
fault will not be deemed a charge of additional interest.7
Discounting Commercial Paper. The discounting of commercial paper by
a national bank is treated as a loan from the purchaser to the seller, regard-
less of whether the paper has been endorsed "with recourse"" or has been
transferred without (or with more restrictive) endorsements.73 Conse-
quently, if such discount exceeds the statutory rate of interest, the discount
will be deemed usurious interest.
As to persons other than national banks, the sale of a third party's note
at a discount is not regarded as a loan by the purchaser of the note to the
seller."4 Commercial paper usurious on its face, however, continues to be
usurious in the hands of a lender who subsequently purchases the paper."'
Similarly, the courts have consistently held that the assignment of con-
ditional sales contracts to a lending institution is not a loan. This financing
technique is illustrated in the recent case of A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv.
Corp.,'8 involving conditional sales contracts covering cars: If a conditional
sales contract provided for a principal amount of $1,000 payable by the
buyer of the car within one year from its date, there would be deducted
from the car dealer's proceeds upon assignment (with recourse) the
amount of $60 representing the "discount" and $250 representing the
"reserve" (which reserve would not be repaid until the buyer had paid the
entire principal amount of his contract).
"8 Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
69 133 Tex. 417, 126 S.W.2d 943 (1939).
70Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 165 So. 2d 182 (Fla. App. 1964); Wichita Falls Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Moss, 82 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error dismissed.
"' Sinclair v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 355 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.
72 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (1945); National Bank v. Johnson, 104 U.S. 271 (1881).
7 Danforth v. National Bank, 48 F. 271 (3d Cir. 1891).
'
4 Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1935); Walker
v. Glenn, 82 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error ref.
7' Gilder v. Hearne, 78 Tex. 551, 14 S.W. 1031 (1890); Lydick v. Stamps, 316 S.W.2d 107
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.
76 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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If deemed a loan, the transaction would have been clearly usurious. De-
spite the following facts-(1) the buyer was not notified of the assign-
ment and continued making his payment to the car dealer, (2) the dealer
remained liable for the full amount of the contract, (3) the lender did
not cause the lien on the car to be placed in its name, (4) the dealer could
repossess the car in the event of a default, (5) the "reserve" withheld by
the lender served as additional security for the payment of the contract,
and (6) the car dealer testified that the transaction was referred to as a
loan secured by a pledge of the conditional sales contract-the court re-
fused to characterize the transaction as a loan. The court admitted that
these facts were consistent with a loan, but remarked that they were not in-
consistent with a sale. Although reciting that it would look through the
form of the transaction to its substance, the court stressed that the contract
documents purported to be an "unconditional sale" and that the lender on
occasion rejected certain contracts as poor risks.
Reservation of Interest in Advance and Commitment Fees. As a general
proposition, a lender may deduct the interest for a year or less in advance,
assuming, of course, that the stated interest rate does not exceed the statu-
tory rate. At the time of receipt, the interest clearly is usurious. Cognizant
of this effect, the Texas Supreme Court in Bothwell v. Farmers' & Mer-
chants' State Bank" characterized the rule as "diflicult to sustain in reason"
and "not entirely defensible on principle" and remarked that "most text-
writers and many judicial opinions have pointed out how devoid of logic
is the rule which sanctions the collection in advance of interest at the high-
est conventional statutory rate, on even short-term loans, under statutes
against usury." 8 The court concluded, however, that "in Texas the rule
sanctioning the reservation of interest in advance at the highest conven-
tional rate for a year or less is too firmly established to be departed from."79
On the other hand, if the loan agreement provides for usurious interest
during the first few years of the term of the loan, even though the total
interest exacted over the entire term is within the statutory rate, the agree-
ment will be deemed usurious."0 As one example, if the loan agreement re-
quired a two and one-half per cent initial fee, plus interest at eight per cent
per year, both of which were payable during the first year of the loan, the
loan would be usurious even though it covered a longer term during which
the entire two and one-half per cent could be absorbed and the average
annual interest rate would be less than ten per cent.
There is some authority, however, for the proposition that if the initial
fee is deemed to be a commitment fee, the charge would not be considered
77 120 Tex. 1, 30 S.W.2d 289 (1930). See also McCarthy v. First Nat'l Bank, 223 U.S. 493
(1912); North Tex. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Moore, 82 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error
dismissed.
7SBothwell v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, 120 Tex. 1, 2, 30 S.W.2d 289, 290 (1930).
See First Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 108 Ill. 633 (1884), in which the Illinois Supreme Court held such
a practice to be usurious.
" Bothwell v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, 120 Tex. 1, 2, 30 S.W.2d 289, 290 (1930).
"°Dallas Trust & Say. Bank v. Brashear, 65 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933).
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interest but rather a charge for an option."' Commitment fees, of course,
are commonly required, particularly in long-term real estate transactions;
and, such fees do, in fact, have at least one characteristic of an option-
if the loan is not closed, the commitment fee is forfeited.
The accrual of interest before advances actually are made, at least ac-
cording to one non-Texas case, will not necessarily render the transaction
usurious since the funds have already been set aside for the borrower's ben-
efit though they have not been disbursed."
V. REMEDIES
As noted above, the Texas usury statutes are designed chiefly to imple-
ment the usury provision of the Texas Constitution by setting forth speci-
fic remedies. The remedies for charging excessive interest vary, depending
in part upon the nature of the lender.
National Banks. The remedies for usurious interest charged by national
banks are exclusively those set forth in federal statutes." National banks
that "knowingly" charge or receive usurious interest on any loan or dis-
count suffer forfeiture of the entire interest on the indebtedness." In the
event usurious interest has been paid, the borrower "in an action in the
nature of an action of debt" may recover "twice the amount of the inter-
est thus paid from the association taking or receiving the same."85 Thus, in
an action by a national bank to recover on the indebtedness, the borrower
may neither set off nor apply against principal any usurious interest he
may have paid." The borrower's sole remedy lies in an original action for
debt to recover the penalty. 7 It has been held, however, that the right to
recover the statutory penalty may be assigned. 8
Licensees Under the Consumer Credit Code. The remedies for usury are
considerably more harsh with respect to licensees under the Consumer
Credit Code, than they were under its predecessor, the Regulatory Loan
Act. The penalties under article 1.06 of the Code include: (1) forfeiture of
twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged, or received, where
8' Pivot City Realty Co. v. State Sav. & Trust Co., 88 Ind. App. 222, 162 N.E. 27 (1928).
See also Paley v. Barton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. 75, 196 A.2d 682 (1964).
82 Bishop v. Blair, 90 Il1. App. 64 (1900), in which advances to be made as construction pro-
gressed were delayed some six months between the time the notes were executed and the time of
the first advance.
83 See, e.g., Moss v. First Nat'l Bank, 251 Ky. 390, 65 S.W.2d 88 (1933). See generally Morris,
The Laws of Usury as Applied to National Banks, 10 BANKING L.J. 847 (1964).
14 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1945).
85 Id.
8"McCollum v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 303 U.S. 568 (1938); Rushing v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank,
162 S.W. 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref. Contra, John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal Nat'l
Bank, 124 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942), in which the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permitted a counterclaim.
87Bothwell v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank & Trust Co., 125 Tex. 488, 84 S.W.2d 229
(1935). Contra, Robertson v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 385, 109 N.W.2d 716 (1961), in which the
court applied against a national bank a state statute making the entire loan void from its inception.
88Lasater v. Jacksboro First Nat'l Bank, 96 Tex. 345, 72 S.W. 1057 (1903), rev'd on other
grounds, 196 U.S. 115 (1905); Taylor v. Sturgis, 68 S.W. 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
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the interest is excessive but not double the amount permitted; and (2)
forfeiture of all principal, as well as interest and all other charges, in the
event double the amount of interest allowed by the Code is contracted for,
charged, or received. In both instances the plaintiff may recover his at-
torneys' fees; and in the latter instance (charging double the permitted
rate) the lender is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not
more than $1,000."
Interestingly enough, if a violation under subsection (1) above results
from an "accidental and bona fide error," then there is no penalty attached.
In contrast with the focus contained in the preface to the Consumer Credit
Code quoted above, this provision seems to evidence a concern with the in-
tent of the lender.-
Other Lenders. Article 5069 declares that "all contracts for usury are
contrary to public policy and shall be void.""1 However, written contracts
providing for usury are void only to the extent of the interest."2 Apparent-
ly only in the case of usury charged in an oral contract will the entire con-
tract be invalidated.
Also, suit may be brought under article 5073 for the recovery of double
the interest paid. 3 Thus, the choice of remedy depends on whether or not
the interest has been paid. If the usurious interest has not been paid, it
need not be; if the usurious interest has been paid, the borrower may re-
cover double the amount of total interest paid."
An additional remedy is furnished in article 4646b' which provides that
the district or county attorney or the attorney general may seek a civil
injunction against any person, firm, or corporation that habitually loans
money at usurious rates.
This array of legislatively created civil and criminal remedies, coupled
with the constitutional mandate, bespeaks a strong public policy condemn-
ing the practice of charging usury. The tone of the statutes is largely penal
and retributive. Moreover, the legislature has attempted to incorporate a
consideration of the intent of the lender in determining the degree of pen-
alties.
The Texas courts have accepted the notion that these remedies are penal.
From this starting point, the courts have increased the burden of proof re-
"TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Supp. 1967).
"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Supp. 1967); see text accompanying note 13
supra.
91TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Supp. 1967). The remedies enacted by the state
legislature are exclusive, and may not be supplemented by city ordinances, Berry v. City of Fort
Worth, 132 Tex. 599, 124 S.W.2d 842 (1939), or by the courts' exercise of equity powers, Ex
parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129 S.W.2d 270 (1939).
'
2 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5071 (1962).
"I1d. art. 5073 (1962).
"t It should be noted, however, that an usurious contract may be purged and the penalties
avoided. This may be accomplished only by cancelling the usurious agreement, Bookhout v. Mc-
George, 65 S.W.2d $12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dismissed, or by substituting a new agree-
ment founded upon independent consideration that will be equal to the usurious interest, Bomar
v. Smith, 195 S.W. 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). If the subsequent contract merely results in re-
arranging the usurious interest, however, the taint of usury survives, Commerce Trust Co. v.
Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940).
"'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4646b (1962).
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quired to show violations and have followed a pattern of strict construc-
tion. In Commerce Trust Co. v. Best,96 for example, the court stated that:
This statute imposes a penalty and therefore is to be strictly construed, at
least in the sense that it is not to be extended beyond the necessities of the
case and is not to be so broadened as to include persons or things outside its
immediate scope and object. . . . This statute was intended to penalize one
who exacts and receives the benefit of usury, not every one who may be
connected with its collection.97
The rule of strict construction followed by the courts is difficult to har-
monize with the strong public policy in the Texas Constitution and sta-
tutes disapproving the exaction of usury. The public policy is announced
and implemented in the strongest terms possible in order to penalize exist-
ing violations and to deter prospective violators. The rule of strict con-
struction, however, has served in many cases to frustrate the public policy
and to sanction creative devices that conflict with legislative attempts to
check credit abuses.
Despite their penal tone, the statutes would seem to be better approached
by comparing them to other civil remedies. The remedies for usury are, in
the main, consistent with other civil remedies and where more severe are
designed as deterrents to abuses that are thought by the legislature to be
commensurately more severe in their adverse effect on society. The uncol-
lectibility of usurious interest not paid is comparable to the unenforceabil-
ity of an illegal contract or other contract contrary to public policy; en-
forcing a usurious contract to the extent of principal in such a context is
hardly penal. Similarly, double recovery allowed for interest paid seems
justified in allowing the borrower to recover interest (and other damages)
on an amount of money he was unlawfully required to pay; the double
recovery may thus be viewed merely as the measure of damages in lieu of a
complex factual determination of actual damages, much as is the case
with regard to treble damages in civil antitrust cases. Nevertheless, to the
extent these remedies are so strictly applied as to devitalize the force of the
constitutional mandate, usurious practices can hardly be expected to be
discouraged.
VI. NON-USURIOus TRANSACTIONS AND
THE FORM-SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
The courts seem to be particularly inclined, in usury cases, to say that
they will exalt substance over form. But, despite what courts may say in
allegiance to the form-substance doctrine, the fact remains that the form
of a financial transaction is of critical importance.
Three-Corner Transactions. A recent Texas Supreme Court decision aptly
demonstrates the success of a cleverly contrived three-corner transaction,
the effect of which is to avoid the application of the usury laws.
96124 Tex. 583, 80 S.W.2d 942 (1935).
17 id. at 591, 80 S.W.2d at 946-47.
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In Stacks v. East Dallas Clinic" the borrower was indebted to East Dallas
Clinic in the total amount of $652.90. The Dallas Retail Credit Managers
Association, together with the Republic National Bank, had arranged a
financing plan with the clinic to enable debtors to pay their bills. The
debtor applied to an agent of the Association for a loan in the amount of
the debt. Concurrently, the debtor signed a non-interest bearing install-
ment note, payable to the Bank, in the amount of the debt. The applica-
tion form and note were forwarded by the agent to the Bank. The debtor
was then required to pay the clinic an amount equal to ten per cent of the
face amount of the note. The clinic then paid this sum to the agent, who
in turn paid half of the sum ( five per cent interest) to the Bank as interest
on the note. The Bank then paid the full face amount of the note (the
debt) to the creditor (the clinic-hospital) and collected monthly install-
ments from the debtor. The original arrangement proved to be too onerous
for the borrower; consequently, the amount of the installments was re-
negotiated, and the borrower was required to pay an additional fee.
The borrower sued under article 5073 to recover "double the amount
of such interest from the person, firm or corporation receiving the same
. ... ." Although acknowledging that the borrower paid usurious interest,
the Texas Supreme Court held that no one received usurious interest. The
clinic merely received payment of its account receivable since it transferred
the interest to the agent; the agent merely received a brokerage fee
(though the fee was characterized as "interest" to the borrower) ; the bank
merely received five per cent interest on its loan. In referring to the clin-
ic, the court stated that "a 'benefit' from the interest refers to a direct
benefit from the receipt and retention of the interest itself, and not some-
thing so incidental as the collection of an account receivable, admitted
due, as in this case."' ° The court then concluded that it would "look
through the form to the substance of a transaction; and the substance here
bears out defendant's contention that it only collected the interest for an-
other, and received no benefit from such interest itself......
The four dissenters, looking to the substance of the transaction, found
a "well designed plan whereby he [the borrower] could obtain a loan, dis-
charge his hospital and clinic bills, but at a cost to him of more than ten
per cent per annum."'
Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of the majority opinion is its ap-
proach. The court states:
A cause of action to recover double the amount of interest paid is derived
from a statute creating a penalty. It is not a suit in tort. Since the statute
is one involving penalties, the court in... [Commerce Trust Co. v. Best] said
that the statute would be strictly construed and that "the language of the
statute is not to be given a mere literal construction." 1"
:8 409 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1966).
99 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5073 (1962).
100 Stacks v. East Dallas Clinic, 409 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex. 1966).
0 1 Id. at 845.
102 Id. at 847.
sea0d. at 846-47.
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The court would have been on firmer ground by basing its decision on
a brokerage-services doctrine-that is, by holding that a portion of the
interest paid was for the services of a broker in handling the loan, which
has traditionally been a permitted practice "safe" from the application of
the usury laws."
The Stacks case is not the first three-cornered transaction to come before
the courts."0 5 In Goodman v. Seely. the owner of real property requested
the lender to loan a prospective purchaser $15,000 in connection with a
proposed purchase and agreed to pay the lender an additional $5,000 for
making such a loan. In a suit to recover the $5,000 the court disallowed
the defense of usury, stating that the owner was not liable on the pur-
chaser's loan, nor was any of his property pledged to secure its payment.
The court continued:
There is no showing that he [owner] would in any way be prejudiced if
the loan were not repaid. This is a case where one for purposes of his own
agrees to pay a certain sum to induce another to loan money to a third
person who knows nothing of the transaction. Ordinarily, a bonus given or
paid by a stranger to a contract for loan or forbearance, for his own pur-
poses or reasons sufficient to himself, to induce the making of such contract
by the lender, does not affect the contract with usury, particularly where
it is without the knowledge or consent of the debtor, the purpose underlying
usury statutes, which is the protection of debtors against hardship and
oppression, having no relevancy where the only loss or detriment is to a
stranger."°7
The result in the Goodman case is perhaps justifiable since the loan ap-
parently was made at the landowner's request: the "guilt" of the lender
is apparently atoned for by the conduct of the borrowers.
But the proposition that a lender may receive additional consideration
from a third party as an inducement to make a loan should be confined to
similar instances since a lender with economic leverage could easily avoid
the usury laws by arranging for a third party to pay additional considera-
tion, the borrower being responsible for paying the third party. And the
courts are beholden to the theory that a third person may charge the bor-
rower a fee for such considerations as endorsing or guaranteeing a loan,
and the fee will not be deemed interest;")' in such cases the borrower, in
effect, has paid usury, but the lender has not received it.
A related doctrine, and perhaps the most anomalous, is the notion that, if
the lender merely requests, rather than requires, the borrower to spend the
proceeds in a certain manner, the transaction will not be rendered usurious.
The leading case illustrating this proposition is Mays v. Pierce," in which
the borrower gave a note and deed of trust for $11,000; at the request of
104See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
10s For another recent illustration of a multi-cornered transaction in which no usury was found
by the court, see Richards v. Moody, 422 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
106243 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
10 Id. at 859. See also Armstrong v. American Bank & Trust Co., 63 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933), leave to file motion for assignment of error granted, 123 Tex. 252, 70 S.W.2d 689
(1934).
.. Gilmer v. Woodson, 332 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Oil City Motor Co. v. C.IT. Corp.,
76 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1935). See also Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942).
09 154 Tex. 487, 281 S.W.2d 79 (1955).
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the lender, the borrower gave a college $1,000 of the proceeds of the loan.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the transaction was not usurious be-
cause the payment was not required as a condition precedent to making
the loan. This result obviously is inconsistent with ordinary commercial
practices. Even in Mays the borrower doubtlessly thought the payment was
a requisite to obtaining the loan since he sued for usury. And it seems
rather likely that, in a commercial context, the lender's requests are in
fact requirements for or conditions to making the loan.
The Credit Price-Cash Price Principle. Perhaps the most striking example
of the form-substance problem is known as the credit price-cash price
doctrine. Prior to the enactment of the Consumer Credit Code and con-
trary to the rule in most states, an installment sale of consumer goods in
Texas was not a lending transaction so long as the seller quoted to the pur-
chaser a cash price and a separate credit price. 0 But if the seller failed to
offer the buyer a choice between a cash price and a time-sale price, the
differential was deemed interest and, if in excess of ten per cent of the
cash price, was considered usurious."
As might be expected, cases posing this problem sink into a quagmire
of conflicting testimony as to what was said at the time of the sale. The
doctrine has proved troublesome not only to the courts and to the retail
merchant whose salesmen fail to recite the magic language, but also to
lending institutions that bought the commercial paper arising from such
transactions since, if the sale is deemed to be an usurious loan, the holder of
the paper is permitted to collect only the principal."'2
Cognizant of the substance of such transactions, 3 the legislature has, in
article 6 of the Consumer Credit Code, regulated the "carrying charges"
that may be imposed in connection with retail installment sales and has
required the amount of the cash price-time price differential to be stated.""
The Collateral Advantage Doctrine. The general rule is that a collateral
transaction between the borrower and lender under which the lender may
earn a profit will not render the transaction usurious, if entered into in
good faith and without an intent to exact usury. Courts are quick to add,
however, that the collateral transaction must not be a guise for obtaining
usury, such as one requiring the borrower to purchase property at an ex-
orbitant price or to sell goods to the lender at a discount. '
"1See, e.g., Lamb v. Ed Maher, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Rattan v.
Commercial Credit Co., 131 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref. See generally Koch,
Time Sales Contracts, 28 TEXAS B.J. 181 (1965); Comment, Usury Statutes as Applicable to the
Sale on Credit, 31 TEXAs L. REv. 55 (1952). The credit price-cash price doctrine is criticized
sharply in Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839,
843 (1955).
"1 See, e.g., Bradford v. Mack, 359 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e.; As-
sociates Inv. Co. v. Baker, 221 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error dismissed.
.1. Clements v. Williams, 136 Tex. 97, 147 S.W.2d 769 (1941).
1
'TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.02(5)(6) (Supp. 1967).
..
4 Hartridge v. Home Life & Accident Ins. Co., 246 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951)
error dismissed.
.
1 C. C. Slaughter Co. v. Eller, 196 S.W. 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.; 58 TEx.
JuR. 2d Usury § 29 (1964).
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Similar problems have arisen challenging the courts to determine the
threshhold question of whether or not the transaction is a loan or some
other form of investment. In Dante v. Givens1" the borrower obtained a
$3,000 loan for one and one-half months and agreed to assign the lender
a $6,800 note and a second mortgage; the lender agreed to reassign the
mortgage upon repayment of the $3,000 plus an additional $600. The court
held that this transaction was an usurious loan and not the sale of a mort-
gage. In Golden State Lanes v. Fex,1 7 a bowling alley, needing $150,000
for remodeling its leased premises, entered an arrangement whereby a
third party advanced the $150,000 for the purchase of the lease. The prem-
ises were then sublet to the bowling alley, and the bowling alley agreed to
repurchase the lease at the end of the stated period for a sum of $150,000.
During the term of the sublease, the bowling alley was required to pay
additional sums for the sublease. The court held that this transaction was
a guise for an usurious loan.
In other cases, the courts have seemed to err on the side of concluding
too quickly that a transaction was a loan. In Glover v. Buchman.8 the
borrower was required, in connection with a loan of $100, to pay $10 for
purchase coupons, having a face value of $12.50, that could be applied as
twenty-five per cent of the purchase price of goods bought from the cou-
pon service company. The court could have pitched its decision on the
ground that the borrower was obtaining a quid pro quo for the additional
commitment it was required to make and that this was not interest. But
the court held that the lender intended to exact usury and noted that "it
is unreasonable to expect needy persons, as a rule, to make full use of
such a coupon..... The court was thus concerned with the power of lenders
to exact collateral advantages from borrowers as a condition to making
the loan. Though the court's concern to penetrate to the substance was
salutary, the appropriate method of attacking such practices would seem
to be under the antitrust laws.
VII. RECENT STATUTORY ENACTMENTS
The current trend in the legislative approach to charging interest is a
continuing, gradual expansion of the scope of permissible charges. Al-
though initially formulated by the courts, the differentiation between cash
price and credit price as set forth in the Consumer Credit Code is one ex-
ample of such expansion."m Another example of expansion, derived from
prior legislation and also carried forward in the Consumer Credit Code,
is the greater interest rates allowable in the case of small loans." '
"" 156 So. 2d 13 (Fla. App. 1963). Compare the following Texas cases: Cotton v. Cooper,
209 S.W. 135 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919) (contract to purchase wages); Ellis v. Security Under-
ground Storage, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (yield for advances included interest
and rentals; lender tried to characterize the fees either as consideration for his signing, endorsing,
and guaranteeing some of borrower's indebtedness or as return from a joint venture).
117 42 Cal. Rptr. 568, 232 Cal. App. 2d 127 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
f' 104 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dismissed.
"I id. at 67.
o'TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.01-6.09 (Supp. 1967).
1 11Id. art. 5069-3.15.
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The amendment to the Insurance Code permitting premiums of credit
insurance to be deemed charges other than interest is an additional ex-
ample;"' this provision has been carried forward in the Consumer Credit
Code by allowing such premiums to be charged in addition to the specified
interest rates."
Another recent illustration is the amendment to the Texas Miscellaneous
Corporation Laws Act permitting corporations to pay up to one and one-
half per cent per month interest on obligations in the principal amount of
$5,000 or more.IM It remains to be seen whether this provision will be
deemed to be constitutionally permissible as legislation fixing maximum
rates of interest at a greater rate than ten per cent, or whether (to avoid
constitutional questions) the statute will be construed as permitting cor-
porations to borrow money at such rates when the rates are permitted in
the particular state (other than Texas) in which the loan is made.
All of these recent statutory enactments have in common the expansion
of the scope of permissible activity with respect to usury. According to
their terms, all appear to be directed at a particular economic and sociolog-
ical effect upon the society as a whole, or upon some designated part of it,
rather than at the culpability of the particular lender.
VIII. A SELECTED CURRENT PROBLEM: COMPENSATING BALANCES
A $1,000 loan for one year, with interest at eight per cent, and with no
other charges of any kind by the lender, is clearly not usurious. But if the
lender requires that $500 of the loan proceeds remain with the lender for
the full term of the loan, then an argument can be made that the amount
actually loaned is only $ 500, and that the effective rate of interest is sixteen
per cent. The nub of the inquiry is not the interest rate, which can be read-
ily computed, but how much is effectively loaned.
The question is not an academic one. It has become increasingly com-
mon for banks to require, as security for or as a condition of default upon
a loan, that the borrower maintain or cause to be maintained with the lend-
ing bank a "compensating balance" during the term of the loan. Although
the question is unsettled, the practice of requiring compensating balances
runs a risk of usury, for a court might hold that the principal of the loan
on which interest is calculated consists of the funds advanced to the bor-
rower less the deposits required to be maintained.
Some commentators and courts in other states have concluded that such
a practice is usurious." In Planters' National Bank v. Wysong & Miles
Co." a bank loaned $2,000 but retained $500 as a deposit of the borrower
not subject to check or withdrawal. The court determined that interest
should be computed on only $1,500, which rendered the transaction usuri-
ous. This case may be distinguishable from current practices in that the de-
... See text accompanying note 40 supra.
125 TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.18 (Supp. 1967).
124Id. art. 5069-2.09.
125 T. PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS § 19.3, at 2369 (1942).
" 177 N.C. 431, 99 S.E. 199, cert. denied, 250 U.S. 665 (1919).
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posit was not subject to withdrawal. Under most loan agreements requir-
ing compensating balances, the deposit, by definition, is subject to the bor-
rower's withdrawal; but the effect of a withdrawal without the consent of
the bank is an event of default under the loan agreement.
The court in another case seems to agree, in general, with the result of
the Wysong & Miles case. In Hershey v. Anderson,"7 following a series of
transactions the culmination of which was a note signed by the borrower
in the amount of $20,000, the bank required the borrower to execute an
additional note for $3,500 with interest payable at six per cent. The agree-
ment called for the proceeds of the $3,500 loan to be used to purchase a
non-interest-bearing certificate of deposit, which was pledged as security
for the $3,500 note. The additional note eventually was paid by offsetting
the certificate of deposit. The court held that requiring this note was mere-
ly a device to collect additional interest from the borrower on the $20,000
loan.
On the other hand, in National Bank v. Levine,"' the bank, in addition
to reserving a discount equal to the maximum interest rate, required the
borrower to make monthly deposits to the credit of a compound interest
account; the account was then assigned to the bank as security for the loan.
The court refused to regard the required deposits as diminutions of prin-
cipal for purposes of determining the amount of interest paid.
No Texas case has squarely presented the question of the treatment to
be accorded to compensating balances. The recent case of Flurry v. Hill-
crest State Bank"2 is, however, analogous. The bank loaned the borrower
$17,502 and required him to give a note in the principal sum of $20,652,
the extra $3,150 representing interest on the note for thirty-six months.
The borrower was then required to open an account with the bank, agree-
ing to pay certain consecutive monthly deposits into the account. In the
collateral agreement the borrower assigned the savings account as further
security for the note. The note expressly declared that, in the event of de-
fault in making such deposits, the balance of the note would become due;
further, the collateral agreement provided for the assignment of the bor-
rower's account and passbook and authorized the bank to apply the funds
in such account on the note in the event he failed to make any of the de-
posits. The court conceded that the documents were ambiguous, but held
that the deposits to the account were actually payments on the note; the
transaction was thereby rendered usurious.
Similarly, in Citizens Industrial Bank v. Schmidt' the borrower bor-
rowed $270, executing a note for $300 bearing ten per cent interest, and
also signed an agreement to purchase an installment certificate for $300 to
be paid out in ten monthly installments of $30 each, the certificate to
yield four per cent interest. The court held that the transaction was usur-
ious and that the installment certificate was only a device to cover the
127 127 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1942).
128277 N.Y.S. 664, 155 Misc. 132 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1933).
2'401 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'30 112 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.
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usurious character of the interest. But the court noted that "if appellant
had complied with the law regulating the operation of Morris Plan banks,
and had made its contract in conformity with the law, [its] contention
might be sustained.' ' 1. The court observed that the borrowers had not been
informed that they were purchasing investment certificates, that no certi-
ficate had been delivered, and that no credits of interest earned or payments
on the investment had been entered on the bank's books. Thus, the court
implied that, had the bank actually paid the interest on the certificate and
observed the other formalities incident to such a practice, a different result
might have been reached.
A related line of cases concerns the investment certificate plan used by
small loan companies. Under this plan, the borrower signs an interest-
bearing note, the amount of which is due at a certain date. As a condition
to obtaining the loan, the borrower is required to subscribe for an invest-
ment certificate having a face amount at maturity equal to the face
amount of the note and yielding interest at one and one-half per cent. The
borrower then makes periodic installment payments under the certificate.
The certificate is pledged as security for the loan. At maturity, the bor-
rower may either apply the certificate to offset the loan or may repay the
loan with separate funds and convert the certificate into a fully paid
certificate earning three per cent interest thereafter.
The Texas courts of appeal divided on the question of whether the
payments on the certificates are a separate, independent transaction or
merely repayments of the loan, in which event the loan becomes usurious.""'
In 1961 the Texas Supreme Court sided with the courts condemning such a
practice as usurious."' It should be noted, however, that these lenders never
issued such certificates except in connection with a loan. This lack of in-
dependent status of the investment may distinguish these cases from a
transaction in which a bank requires a certificate of deposit as collateral.
A contrary line of Texas cases involves loans by building and loan as-
sociations. As a condition to obtaining the loan, the borrower was required
to pay an "admission fee" and subscribe for stock in the association." In
absolving this practice from the taint of usury, the courts stressed that a
dual relationship was created: that of borrower and member. Since the
savings and loan statute provided that borrowing members would share in
losses, as well as in profits, and were permitted to vote at shareholders'
lald. at $14.
.. State v. Pacific Fin. Loans, 337 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), aff'd, 161 Tex. 619,
343 S.W.2d 232 (1961); State v. Household Fin. Corp., 334 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960),
aff'd, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961); State v. Community Fin. & Thrift Corp., 334
S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), aff'd, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961); Harrell v.
Colonial Fin. Corp., 341 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e.-all condemning this
practice. Steiner v. Community Fin. & Thrift Corp., 258 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
error dismissed by agreement; Reams v. Community Fin. & Thrift Corp., 236 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951)-both approving this practice. This type of plan was authorized by statute. T]Ex.
REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1524a-1 (1962). The court in State v. Community Fin. & Thrift
Corp., supra, however, ruled the statute unconstitutional.
" Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961).
"Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Goforth, 94 Tex. 259, 59 S.W. 871 (1900); Wood v.
Continental Say. & Bldg. Ass'n, 56 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933).
[Vol. 22
meetings,13 a genuine separation of attributes was preserved. One court also
stressed the fact that the borrower might receive up to six per cent return
on his stock investment."'
Assuming the validity of the dual relationship theory, an argument
could be constructed in support of the practice of requiring compensating
balances or certificates of deposit. A demand deposit or a certificate of de-
posit creates a debt owed by the bank to the borrower. Either has inde-
pendent significance, as is demonstrated by the large number of deposits
and certificates of deposit that are unrelated to loan transactions. The
borrower becomes at once debtor and creditor. Further, the borrower, at
least theoretically, is in control of the funds-he may withdraw the de-
mand deposit or cash out the certificate of deposit. The funds are simply
further collateral for the loan in a case where the borrower is unable to
offer alternative acceptable collateral to the bank. There is no demonstrable
intent to exact usury since the borrower will receive all the funds and pay
only a legal rate of interest on the principal.
Nevertheless, the practice of requiring compensating balances presents a
serious risk of a claim of usury, and courts may well be sympathetic to
such a charge. There are several possible procedures that might success-
fully be used in lieu of expressly requiring compensating balances by a
provision in the loan agreement. One is simply to have an understanding
that, as a good faith business deal, the borrower would be expected to
become a customer of the bank and maintain certain demand deposits with
the bank. Nothing is put in writing, and the subject is not discussed spe-
cifically as a condition to making the loan. If the borrower fails to main-
tain the anticipated balances, this would be a factor in considering a re-
newal or further advances under a line of credit. A second method would
be to require or request a borrower to cause a third person to maintain de-
posit balances with the bank-the third person could be an affiliated com-
pany or the like. This practice would at least preserve an argument that
the full principal is, in fact, being advanced or made available to the bor-
rower. And under a fundamentalist approach, such as that in the Stacks
case discussed above,'3 such a three-corner arrangement likely would shel-
ter the transaction from an attack on the basis of usury. This method,
however, might be vulnerable to attack on an agency theory.
As is evident in this discussion, analogies to different lines of cases may
lead to different conclusions in an attempt to resolve the compensating bal-
ances problem. A recalling of the "past" of usury offers little help in the
analysis, for the "guilt" or even the intent of the lender in such cases is
hardly discernible and not particularly relevant. What does seem important
is a careful analysis of the sociological effect of each particular transaction.
The effect varies from case to case, depending on the economic leverage of
the lender, the station in society of the borrower (and thus the "risk"),
money-market conditions, and the like. The resolution of this question,
"3 Former art. 881a-34, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1964).
"'Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Goforth, 94 Tex. 259, 59 S.W. 871 (1900).
37 See text accompanying notes 98-104 supra.
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then, will necessarily involve careful consideration of every aspect of the
transaction.
IX. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion of compensating balances is illustrative of the
difficulties encountered when approaching an usury question not previous-
ly decided by the courts. The religious "past" of usury, while helpful in
understanding its development and on occasion accounting for the ap-
proach taken in judicial decisions, is not very helpful in solving current
problems. Even the economic and sociological "past" of usury is not par-
ticularly helpful in the resolution of current issues, for economic and so-
ciological considerations change. In recognition of that fact, the Texas
Legislature has followed a pattern, for the past several years, of expanding
the limits of charges that are permissible in connection with loans. It has
also determined to concentrate its regulation on those lending transactions
pertaining to the segments of society that are largely incapable of main-
taining an even bargaining position.
One consequence of the emphasis upon the economic and sociological
effect of usury is that of viewing lending transactions in the same terms as
other investments; that is, the recent legislation tends to set a maximum
yield commensurate with the risk involved. Lending transactions are pres-
ently regulated, not to preserve any notion of their inherent differences
from other investment transactions, but chiefly to curb abusive credit
practices with their attendant adverse social implications, much as monop-
olization and unfair trade practices are regulated for similar purposes.
Courts will continue to be confronted with problems of ascertaining
what charges constitute interest and of examining the substance of trans-
actions framed to avoid the application of the usury laws. Courts histori-
cally have wavered between the variant approaches to usury questions, on
some occasions stressing the "guilt" of the lender, on others stressing the
form of transactions, and on others stressing the importance of a strict
construction of the usury laws; too often, it would seem, courts have dis-
regarded the substance of the transaction in favor of other approaches.
If the focal point in an usury case is to be its sociological and economic
implications, the courts must scrutinize every aspect of the litigated trans-
actions. And since what is considered economically and sociologically im-
portant changes from time to time, the courts must be prepared to change
the context of their inquiry. This approach means, in essence, a case by case
development of guidelines that expand or contract as the economic or so-
ciological considerations vary-an approach similar to that required in de-
termining the "unconscionability" of a sales transaction under article
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' One of the consequences of
this approach will be a lack of certainty as to the applicability of the
usury laws to particular types of transactions. But a substantial degree of
... UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
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uncertainty already exists, and predictability, while desirable, is not so im-
portant that it overrides all the other pertinent considerations.
The end to be achieved is not a logically correct but rigidly doctrinaire
statutory construction; rather, what is sought is a balance between curbing
abusive lending practices, on the one hand, and allowing an appropriate
return for the loan of money on the other. It is this approach, and not an
approach based either on "punishment" or upon "strict construction" to
avoid punishment, which should form the basis of the public policy in
Texas in the field of usury law.
